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Abstract
The present study attempted to either extend, modify
or challenge Rokeach's (1973) Self-confrontation theory of
value change.

Rokeach (197 3) found that subjects who were

confronted with specific self-confrontation messages,
which were designed to make differences between their value
systems and self-concepts salient, were more likely than con
trol subjects to change the rank-ordering of the values
Freedom and Equality in a ranking task containing 18 values.
Rokeach explained this phenomenon by invoking the concept
of self-dissatisfaction, which he said subjects came to feel
as a result of being exposed to the self-confrontation messages.
The present study compared this explanation with the
Reference Group Influence theory of Kelman

(1958) and others

who felt that subjects would modify values merely by iden
tifying with certain positively perceived reference groups.
In a simple single-factor design, four experimental
conditions were compared with a control condition.

The

experimental conditions consisted of separate self-confront
ation manipulations derived from Rokeach's original manip
ulation.

These were:

(1) an Intrinsic Inconsistency condition which implied to
subjects an inconsistency between their own value systems
and self-concept, based on information not taken from an
external source;

(2) a Reference Group only condition, which
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exposed subjects to value rankings of a potential reference
group;

(3) an Extrinsic Inconsistency condition, which im

plied an inconsistency between values and self-concept,
based on the value rankings of the reference group;

(4)

a Replication condition, which was a virtual replication of
Rokeach

(1973); and (5) a Control condition.

Behavioral

measures which were thought to reflect value change
were also taken.

Results indicated that the Intrinsic Inconsistency
subjects were the only ones to elevate rankings of the
value "Equality" significantly more than the controls.
Although the Intrinsic Inconsistency condition's responses
to behavioral measures were also greatest among the five
conditions, this relationship was not significant.

Thus

only limited support was found for Rokeach's self-confron
tation theory, and no evidence svas found for a reference
group influence effect.

Possible explanations for

these findings were offered as well as possibilities
for future research.
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Group Influence and Cognitive Consistency
as Determinants of Value Change:
A Methodological Analysis of
Self-Confrontation Theory
The study of attitudes and attitude change has
been one of the major areas of investigation for many
social psychologists for almost four decades.

These

researchers have busied themselves with attempts at
theoretical formulations designed to establish relation
ships between attitudes and all aspects of behavior.
Ultimately, the study of attitude change brought about
various postulations concerning the mechanisms involved
in maintaining and/or achieving cognitive consistency.
Specifically, theories tried to explain people's attempt
to reconcile perceived differences between two or more
held attitudes.

The theories generally held that these

perceived differences or inconsistencies resulted in
some specific affective or motivational state, such
as cognitive dissonance.

The person was then motivated

to act in a way which would remove this "uncomfortable"
state by reducing the inconsistency.

This could be done

by adopting some attitude or behavior which was consis
tent or congruent with other attitudes or behaviors.

Rokeach (1973) has classified various cognitive
consistency theories in terms of the nature of various
types of inconsistency.

For example, Abelson and Ro

senberg (1958) proposed a theory of cognitive-affective
consistency which dealt with contradictions between
the perceived usefulness of an attitude object to real
ize certain goals, and the favorable or unfavorable
attitudes toward the object.

Similarly, Osgood and

Tannenbaum's (1955) Gongruity theory posed the effects
of contradictions between two attitude systems.

Heider's

(1958) and Newcomb's (1959) theories described contra
dictions between an attitude system and a cognition
about a significant other's attitude, and McGuire (1960)
dealt with contraaictions between'beliefs concerning
one attitude object.

Dissonance theorists (Festinger,

1957) discussed conflict between an attitude and a be
havioral cognition.

Finally, Hovland (1957) dealt with

contradictions between one’s own attitude and the per
ceived attitude of significant others.
Another issue precipitated by research in attitude
change has been the validity of attitude change findings
over the long term.

It has even been suggested that

researchers have tended to emphasise the search for var
iables affecting the change process itself, while not
concerning themselves with factors underlying the per
sistence or non-persistence of these changes.

Cook
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and Play (1978) point out that
Most researchers have focused on the deter
minants of immediate attitude change...
However, there has teen no corresponding in
terest in studying the conditions under which
attitude change persists over time.

Indeed,

there is no comprehensive review of the per
sistence literature other than short lists of
relevant experiments up to 1969.

(p. 2)

Similarly, Rokeach (1973) has stated that the chan
ges in attitudes found in cognitive consistency studies
are typically found to he short-lived.

Even though

achieving consistency implies restoration of a previous
ly disrupted state of equilibrium,
cognitive theories in social psychology have
not asked whether an attitude change merely
restores the consistency held at an earlier
level or represents a higher or lower, more or
less integrated, or mature or self-actualized
level of consistency.

(p. 223)

.So Rokeach is implying that attempting to change atti
tudes by making attitudinal discrepancies salient to
subjects is useless since it only results in short-term
change.
Rokeach, in his theory, has tried to circumvent

the problem of short-term attitude change by invoking
the concept of value.

Rokeach (1973) sees values as rnor

central than attitudes.

A value is seen as an

enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief
that a specific mode of behavior or end-state
of existence is preferred to an oppositive
mode of behavior or end-state.

This belief

transcends attitudes toward objects and sit
uations, ideology, presentations of self to
others, evaluations, judgments, justifica
tions, comparisons of self with others, and
attempts to influence others.

(p. 25)

Rokeach makes clear the major differences between
an attitude and a value:
an attitude refers to an organisation of
several beliefs around a specific object
or situation.

A value, on the other hand,

refers to a single belief of a very specific
kind.

It concerns a desirable mode of behav

ior or end-state that has a transcendental
quality to it, guiding actions, attitudes,
judgments and comparisons across specific ob
jects and situations and beyond immediate goals
to more ultimate goals.

(p. 18)

In this sense, the differentiation between value
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and attitude is clearly made by virtue of the emphasis
being placed on the arbitrary evaluative nature of val
ues.

Whereas attitude is sometimes seen as the result

of a sum total of qualitatively evaluated beliefs
(Fishbein and Azjen,

1975), values are the sources of

these evaluations, standards upon which each individual
attitude toward objects or situations are based.

A

person has as many attitudes as he has interactions with
objects or situations; he has only as many values as he
has learned beliefs concerning desirable modes of be
havior and end-states of existence.
Most importantly, values are seen to occupy a more
central position than attitudes in one's own cognitive
system, and thus are determinants of both attitudes
and behavior.

For Rokeach, the cognitive system main

tains an inner "core".

Functionally organized, around

this inner core is a hierarchy of cognitive concepts,
The layer most central to the core consists of the
terminal values which are the individual's beliefs
concerning desirable end-states of existence.

Next

are the instrumental values which are beliefs concerning
desirable modes of conduct which are "instrumental"
in achieving the terminal values.

The final layer is

the individual's attitudes toward relevant objects.
Thus,

in the cognitive system it is values, and es

pecially the terminal values, which are seen to be
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most central to "behavior; specifically, this is because
they are used as standards of behavior.
Among the instrumental and terminal values, there
is yet another theoretical differentiation:
values and Competence values.

Morality

Morality values refer to

those with an interpersonal focus which, when violated,
result in feelings of guilt for wrongdoing.

Competence

values are more at an intrapersonal level; their vio
lation leads to feelings of shame about personal in
adequacy.
There is, however,

something even more central

which interacts with values to affect attitudes and be
havior:

the self-concept.

Rokeach defines the self-

concept as "an organization of all the distinctive cog
nitions, negative as v/ell as positive, and the affective
connotations of these cognitions that would be displayed
if a full answer to the question

'Who am I?' were forth

coming" (p. 215). The functions served by values essen
tially converge into one major function:
and enhance one's self-concept.

to help maintain

Specifically, values

maintain and enhance an individual's concept of his
own morality and competence.
We can now see the importance of Rokeach's theory
within the framework of cognitive consistency.

Ac

cording to Rokeach, all of the various cognitive concepts
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are interdependent.

The more central the concept to

the entire system, the more enduring and far-reaching
should he its effects on other parts of the system.
For example, a change in an individual's selfconcept (which, as Rokeach points out, is an aim of
psychotherapy) leads to a change in functionally related
terminal values, instrumental values and attitudes, and
inevitably,

in behavior.

For example, someone whose

self-concept were to change from one of dependence to
one of autonomy might increase the importance of the
terminal value "A Sense of Accomplishment" in his value
system.

This change should be reflected in behavior

requiring greater ambition.
Likewise, a change in any one of the cognitive con
cepts other than self-concept would also lead to changes
in the other concepts, but these changes would probably
not be as enduring.
Rokeach feels that psychologists have assumed values
to be far more resistant to change than attitudes.
This is why the overwhelming preference in the literature
has been for the study of attitudes over values.

Un

fortunately, changes in attitude appear to be short
lived because, according to Rokeach,

the more central

values underlying them have been left intact.
Consistency theorists have maintained that change

8
takes place when various attitudes or cognitions are
seen to be inconsistent.

This inconsistency results

in a discomfort of some sort which the person is then
motivated to relieve.

Relief is achieved when an atti

tude or cognition changes so as to be congruent with
remaining attitudes or cognitions.

Rokeach maintains

that even though the changed attitude may be more con
gruent with other attitudes, cognitions or behaviors,
it may be even more inconsistent with the underlying
values that have not changed.

Rokeach theorizes that

when attituae-attitude or attitude-cognition inconsis
tencies are resolved,

it creates an even greater at-

titude-value or cognition-value inconsistency.

The

accompanying tension is therefore even greater than that
experienced previously.

The only way to relieve this

tension is for the changed attitude to revert back to
its original position after a short period of time.
This, Rokeach says, is why most attitude change is
not long-lasting.

Changed attitudes are of necessity

still in conflict with unchanged values.
To achieve permanent attitude change, Rokeach sug
gests that one must first change the underlying value.
Values should be subject to change using cognitive
contradictions in the same way that attitudes change by
being in contradiction with o n e ’s self-concept.

Rolceach states that "A value should undergo enduring
change if maintenance or enhancement of self-conception
is at stake..."

(p. 217).

If a value is in conflict

with one's self-concept, the value changes to become con
sonant with the self-concept, and this value change
affects attitudes as well as behavior.
The hypothetical motivational construct which
Rokeach employs in his consistency theory is that of
i

self-dissatisfaction.

Any perceived discrepancy between

self-conceptions and values, attitudes or behavior is
experienced as a state of self-dissatisfaction.

Thus

Rokeach is postulating that the motivator for change
is the affective experience of self-dissatisfaction,
caused by the perception of inconsistency among values,
attitudes or behaviors.

Whenever any of these cognitive

entities conflict with each other, the one that is at
odds with the self-concept is the one that will change.
Thus, if a value and an attitude conflict, the value
will change if it is not consonant with the self-concept.
Similarly,

if the attitude is not consonant with the self-

concept, it is the attitude that will change in order
to become more consistent with the self-concept and the
value.
Rokeach (1973) outlines four major differences
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between his and other consistency theories:
1) In Rokeach's theory, cognitive inconsistency is
seen as a discrepancy between some cognitive element
and one's self-concept.

While other theorists have uti

lized the self-concept to some extent in their theories
(Aronson, 1969; Secord and Backman,

1965), the range

of possible discrepancies between the self-concept and
other cognitive entities has been extended by Rokeach.
2) Rokeach's theory stresses values as a more cen
tral construct than attitudes for cognitive consistency.
"A clear distinction between the value and attitude con
cepts is as indispensable for the behavioral sciences
as the distinction between genes and chromosomes is for
biology and genetics"

(p. 231).

3) Attitude theories tend to predict what are ul
timately short-term changes.

Rokeach's theory is at

tempting to address itself to long-term change.
4) Implicit in the theory is that behavior change
should follow value change.

Whereas hard evidence con

cerning behavior change as a result of attitude change
is relatively rare (Wicker,

1969), the present theory

predicts that behavior change should result from chan
ges in the value system.
In his major work in the area, Rokeach (1973)
confronted subjects with inconsistencies between their
held values and their self-concept.

The techniques used
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to raise individuals' awareness of these inconsistencies
are referred to as "self-confrontation procedures" and
are assumed to result in a heightened state of self
dissatisfaction.

In an effort to relieve themselves

of this negative affective state, Rokeach reasoned,
subjects would then modify their value systems in such
a way as to make them more congruent with their selfconcept.

That is, certain values in their value "hier

archy" would become more important in order to establish
continuity with their self-concept.
In utilizing the self-confrontation procedure,
Rokeach exposed students to information which was de
signed to evoke self-dissatisfaction in individuals who
had ranked the value Equality low in value rankings of
importa.nce.

Equality was selected as a target value

because previous research had indicated a discrepancy
between individuals' rankings of Equality and the re
lated value Freedom.
In previous research at the National Opinion Re
search Center (NORC), median rankings for Equality, Free
dom and the other terminal and instrumental values had
been established for a nationwide sample of subjects.
The median ranking of Equality for the college student
sample was 3.30, while the median ranking for Freedom
was 5.38.

Rokeach believed that most subjects in his study,
who had ranked Equality low relative to the value Free
dom could be confronted with certain statements imply
ing inconsistencies between their self-concept and their
value system.

He assumed that most people, especially

college students, conformed to an American societal
norm of having an egalitarian self-concept.

There

fore, he suggested to subjects that their low ranking
of Equality relative to Freedom is basically inconsisten
with their egalitarian self-concept.

He reinforced this

inconsistency by interpreting the discrepancy in ranking
to mean that they valued freedom for themselves as more
important than freedom for others.

The self-dissatis

faction resulting from this perceived inconsistency
was expected to lead to an increased regard for the
value Equality, which was in turn expected to lead to
changes in behaviors reflecting this value.
Subjects were first administered the Terminal
Value section of the Rokeach Value Survey, Form E.
The Survey is a list of 18 terminal values shown in
alphabetical order.

The 18 values were derived from a

much larger list, obtained from sources like Rokeach
himself,

30 graduate students, and 100 adults from

metropolitan Lansing, Michigan.

Values were elimina

ted by correlating value rankings and removing the
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higher correlated values from the pool.

Others were

eliminated if they did not signify end-states of exis
tence or were just too specific.

The Survey has gone

through five physical revisions, at one point going
from 12 to 18 values.

Test-retest reliabilities for

college-age subjects range from about .75-.80, depend
ing on the form used.
In the Rokeach experimental situation, the subject
is simply asked to "arrange them (the values) in order
of their impoi’tance to YOU, as guiding principles in
YOUR life."

Each value is accompanied parenthetically

by a short definition of the value.

The 18 terminal

values are as follows:
1.

A Comfortable life (a prosperous life)

2.

An Exciting life (a stimulating, active life)

3.

A Sense of Accomplishment (lasting contribution)

4.

A World at Peace (free of war and conflict)

5.

A V/orld of Beauty (beauty of nature & the arts)

6.

Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)

7.

Family Security (taking care of loved ones)

8.

Freedom (independence, free choice)

9.

Happiness (contentedness)

10.

Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflict)

11.

Mature Love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)

12.

National Security (px’otection from attack)

1'3.

Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
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14.

Salvation (saved, eternal life)

15.

Self-Respect (self-esteem)

16.

Social Recognition (respect, admiration)

17.

True Friendship (close companionship)

18.

Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)

After rank ordering the terminal values, the sub
jects were shown the median rank ordering of the values
by 298 Michigan State University students.

The fact

that the value Freedom had been ranked first by the
sample, and that the value Equality had been ranked
eleventh was pointed out to the students.

It was then

suggested that seeing Freedom as relatively important and
Equality as relatively unimportant might be interpreted
as meaning that someone like that sees his own freedom
as very important but sees others1 freedom as not nearly
as important.

It was in this way that the perceived

inconsistency between the subjects’ egalitarian selfconcept and their low value ranking of Equality relative
to Freedom was to result in self-dissatisfaction.
After spending a few minutes comparing their rankings
with those of the sample of students, subjects were
asked if they were or were not in sympathy with the
aims of civil rights demonstrators.

This led to yet

another attempt to manipulate self-dissatisfaction.
Subjects were then shown a table illustrating the median
student rankings of the values Freedom and Equality
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as a function of whether or not the sample students
sympathized with the aims of civil rights demonstrators.
Based on the data in that table, certain inferences were
made salient to the subjects:
Students who are strongly for civil rights
value Equality rather highly— they ranked
it five; but these against civil rights place
a much lower value on Equality— they ranked
it 17 in importance... This raises the ques
tion whether those who are against civil
rights are really saying that they care a
great deal about their own freedom but are
indifferent to other people's freedom.

Those

who are for civil rights are perhaps really
saying they not only want freedom for them
selves but for other people too (p. 238).
Subjects then rated the strength of their agreement
with this interpretation of the data, as v/ell as their
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their own value
rankings.
Three weeks later, subjects reranked the values.
Control groups had x'anked the values initially but had
not been exposed to any of the feedback of others' val
ues or the inconsistency manipulations.
Again, three to five months after the pretest and
experimental treatment, all subjects reranked the value
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list.

At about the same time, they also received by mail

"letters of solicitation", ostensibly from the NAACP
requesting membership and a one dollar membership fee.
This solicitation was made again approximately one year
following the initial one.

The responses to the solic

itations were used as behavioral measures of the impor
tance of Equality in one's value system.
Rokeach found significant increases in the value
hierarchy for the values Equality and Freedom in three
separate studies, the latter two utilizing a third post
test 15-17 months after the experimental treatment.
In all three studies, median rankings of these values
by subjects in self-confrontation conditions increased
significantly from pretest rankings as well as being sig
nificantly different from the controls.

Equality rank

ings typically increased twice as much as did Freedom
rankings.

In addition, value change remained through

both three-week and three-month intervals.

Significant

changes in control groups, where found, were in the
opposite direction.

Also, significantly more solic

itations were answered with contributions in self
confrontation groups than control groups, although this
effect was much stronger in the first .posttest than in
the second or third.

Expressed self-dissatisfaction
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with the way pretest values had been ranked was also
significantly greater in self-confrontation subjects
than in controls.
Close examination of the self-confrontation proce
dure raises questions regarding the precise cause of
value changes in Rokeach's study.

Rokeach's basic

premise is that the self-confrontation technique raises
the subject's awareness of inconsistencies between
cognitions concerning his values and his self-concept.
The awareness of these inconsistent cognitions results
in self-dissatisfaction, which in turn motivates value
change in an effort to remove the disparity between
held values and self-concept.

In the procedure section

of his study, Rokeach states that he attempted to arouse
this state of self-dissatisfaction in the subjects
three separate times.
The first attempt to manipulate self-dissatisfaction
made salient a possible contradiction between self-concept
and terminal values.

Rokeach reasoned that subjects who

see themselves as equally in favor of freedom for all
people should logically rank the values Freedom and
Equality as approximately equal in importance in their
value systems.

If the subjects rank Freedom much higher

in importance than Equality, then this implies that
subjects are much more concerned with their own freedom
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than with anyone else's.
Rokeach confronted his subjects with this logical
inconsistency by showing them the value rankings obtained
from 298 college students.

The median ranking for

.Freedom had been 1, that for Equality had been 11.
Rokeach then suggested to his subjects that because
these students ranked Freedom much higher than Equality,
they were more interested in their own freedom than
other people's freedom.

Since the subjects had previous

ly ranked their values in a similar manner, this served
to suggest an inconsistency in the subject's mind.
That is, he has an egalitarian self-concept, yet Equality
is not nearly as important a value as is Freedom.
Theoretically,

subjects will relieve the resulting self

dissatisfaction by changing the importance of this value
in their value system to make it consistent with their
egalitarian self-concept.

Thus, their ranking of Equal

ity should increase in importance.
Addressing possible alternative explanations for
this change, Rokeach raised the possibility of conform
ity pressure, but argued that conformity would result
in the maintenance of the original value rankings.
That is, conformity pressure should result in no change
or a decrease in the importance of Equality since the
rankings cf values by the 298 sample students essentially
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agreed with the pretest rankings of the subjects.
However, a self-confrontation procedure should result
in Equality becoming more important.

Thus, Rokeach

was attempting to establish value change in a direction
away from the position apparently advocated by the sample
of MSU students.
Nevertheless, rather than relying on a single manip
ulation of self-confrontation, Rokeach added a second
self-dissatisfaction manipulation.
may have,

This manipulation

in fact, resulted in group pressure to change

values in the same direction predicted by Rokeach.
This attempt at arousing self-dissatisfaction was imple
mented by implying a contradiction between the subject's
self-concept and his values and attitudes.

First,

the subject committed himself to a position on civil
rights and demonstrations.

Then the subjects were shown

data depicting value rankings of previous subjects as
a function of their position on civil rights and demon
strations.

The written description of this data indi

cated that individuals who were positive toward civil
rights ranked both Equality and Freedom relatively high
and close together, while those w'ho felt negatively
toward civil rights and demonstrations ranked Equality
much lower than Freedom.
Even though Rokeach maintains that self-dissatis-
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faction should, result from this information, no inconsis
tency seems to have been made salient at this point.
Instead, what seems to be happening is that informa
tion is being provided regarding a reference group.
The 298 students who originally ranked the values are
categorized as members of the "strong civil rights
group", the "middle group", or the "anti-civil rights
group".

In the description of this data, it is pointed

out to the subjects that the students who were labeled
as "strongly for civil rights" rank Equality higher
than the other two groups and closer to Freedom than the
other two groups.

In fact, this pro-civil rights group

ranked Equality higher than Freedom.

Thus, subjects

were provided information about a reference group and
how that group ranked Freedom and Equality.

As a re

sult, it is very possible that subjects felt pressure
to align their values with a positively perceived ref
erence group (Kelman,
civil rights.

1958), i.e., those strongly for

Therefore,

if subjects are changing their

values as a result of this manipulation, it is not
clear whether change is due to the arousal of self
dissatisfaction stemming from the awareness of an in
consistency between value system and self-concept, or to
subjects’ attempts to realign their values with and
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conform to the values of members of a positively perceived
reference group (or attempts to avoid conforming to a
negatively perceived reference group).
In the same study, Rokeach made yet another self
confrontation attempt.

In the first manipulation he had

implied that subjects who differentiated in importance
between the values Freedom and Equality in their value
systems were actually being inconsistent with their
egalitarian self-concept.

In the second manipulation,

he displayed data that merely showed that the people who
do make this differentiation are those who are not
sympathetic toward civil rights.

In this third manip

ulation attempt, Rokeach tried to elicit self-dissatis
faction by establishing a logical inference based on
these first two premises.

If people who rank Equality

much lower than Freedom are being inconsistent, and if
data indicate that people who do not strongly favor civil
rights make this differentiation, then the logical in
ference is that people who do not strongly favor civil
rights have value systems inconsistent with their selfconcept.

That is, those who do not strongly favor

civil rights see their own freedom as more important
than other people's freedom.

Conversely, this conclusion

implies that people who strongly favor civil rights are
consistent and value freedom for all people as much as
they value their o w r .

He accomplishes all this by sug-
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gesting to subjects that
those who are against civil rights are reallysaying that they care a great deal about their
own freedom but are indifferent to other peo
ple's freedom.

Those who are for civil rights

are perhaps really saying they not only want
freedom for themselves but for other people
too (p. 4 2 6 ).
According to Rokeach, those who see themselves as truly
egalitarian should realize this inconsistency in them
selves, become dissatisfied with themselves, and change
their value systems to make Equality closer in impor
tance to Freedom.
Unfortunately, this third manipulation attempt at
evoking inconsistency is impossible to utilize without
first exposing subjects to the data from the reference
group.

Therefore,

it seems impossible to tell whether

the resultant value change is derived from inconsis
tencies brought to awareness during self-confrontation
or simply from the subjects' desire to align their values
with those "most strongly for civil rights".
It might be useful to distinguish between the two
types of inconsistencies being utilized here.

The first

manipulation .involved an inconsistency derived solely
from the subject's own value system and self-concept,
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arid that was intrinsic in origin.

The last manipulation

required information about the values of an external source
or group to establish inconsistency.

Thus, it is pos

sible that such "intrinsic" inconsistencies (as in the
first manipulation) and "extrinsic" inconsistencies
(as in the third) would have differential effects on
value change.

That is, only one of these methods of ef

fecting value change may have actually been responsible
for the changes in Rokeach's study.

But, because the

effect of each method is never measured separately,
the type of inconsistency which accounts for this value
change cannot be specified.
Rokeach maintained that all of the attempts to arouse
self-dissatisfaction did so in the same way, and by
inference, are additive.

Since Rokeach never specifies

how much self-dissatisfaction is necessary to evoke value
change, then apparently any of the above three situations
should be sufficient to do so.

On the other hand, it

is possible that the entire effect observed by Rokeach
is not due to self-dissatisfaction at all, but simply
a result of information about the values of a reference
group contained in the second self-dissatisfaction
arousal attempt.

It seemed necessarjq therefore, to

test the individual effects of the specific arousal at
tempts inds pend ently in order to determine which of

these explanations accounts for his results.
Other studies involving the Rokeach paradigm have
mostly been done by students and associates of Rokeach,
and have similarly failed to tease out possible confoundings with group influence.

The studies were originally

conceived in order to specify other modifiable values
and behaviors.
Rokeach and Cochrane (1972), in a preliminary study,
found that in conditions both of privacy,

in which the

subject was not closely observed, and non-privacy,
he was carefully observed,

in whic

significant increases in the

value rankings of both Freedom and Equality were found
from eight to nine weeks after the self-confrontation
procedure.

It had been theorized that value change

would be minimized in a non-private situation, one which
would encourage defensiveness in the subject.
not found to be the case.

This was

Subjects can indeed undergo

value change in non-private situations.
In an attempt to find out whether awareness of one's
own value hierarchy is a precondition for the Rokeach
effect, Rokeach and McLellan (1972) replicated the
original Rokeach study but subjects did not complete the
pre-manipulation Value Survey.

They reasoned that self

feedback of one's values in the form of a pre-test
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might not be necessary since, through the process of
social comparison,

subjects always have access to and

make use of cognitions concerning their current value
system.

Significant increases in the rankings of both

Freedom and Equality for the experimental group were
f'ouna four weeks after the self-confrontation session.
Similar results were found in a condition that replicated
the previously discussed (Rokeach,

1975) research.

Rokeach and McLellan (1972) concluded that a pretest
is not necessary to make subjects’ values salient in
the self-confrontation procedure.
Rokeach (1975) eliminated human experimenters com
pletely when he replicated his original findings by us
ing a computer terminal instead of an experimenter to
supply feedback.

Subjects presented with this feedback

showed value change two months after the treatment.
The control group showed no such effect.

Again, how

ever, subjects v/ere receiving reference group informa
tion, and may have changed their values on the basis of
this group influence.
It is important to note that in the three abovementioned studies, group influence is still a viable
alternative explanation for the results.

The studies

were basically methodologically similar to the original
study.

Possible confounding with, reference group influence
seems especially clear in a related study by Hollen
(1972).

Hollen raised the target value "A World of

Beauty" in college students merely by pointing out to
them that "young people and better-educated people tend
to rank *A World of Beauty’ higher than the general
public ranks it."

Presumably, Rokeach's explanation of

this finding was that subjects see their low ranking
of "A World of Beauty" as incompatible with their selfconcept of being young and well-educated, and somehow
different from the general population.

Reference group

influence may actually be the main factor responsible
for the effect,

since students may not wish to see them

selves as deviating from the values of their reference
group.
To see if value modification would affect smoking
behavior, Conroy, Katkin and Barnette (1973) increased
self-control in smokers by suggesting that "people who
have trouble quitting cigarettes are trying to be broad
minded about a task that requires rigid self-discipline"
to subjects who had ranked the value "Broadminded"
third and "Self-disciplined" eighth.

Over a set of

four blocks of four days each, smokers not only raised
their rankings of the value "Self-disciplined", but
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maintained a low cigarette consumption of about two
cigarettes per four day block.

This was in comparison

with a control group whose consumption averaged about
eight times that amount.

For Rokeach, this is strong

evidence that value change facilitates change of atti
tudes toward specific behaviors (e.g., quitting smoking).
However, again, these results may be due to subjects
feeling the effects of group influence.

Subjects see

themselves as members of the "trying to quit smoking"
reference group, and thus do whatever they are told
group members do, i.e., be self-disciplined.

It may

very 'well be that the subjects' desire to act with the
desired group rather than self-dissatisfaction with their
value systems that was truly responsible for these ef
fects.
Finally, Greenstein (1976) attempted to extend the
research into a field setting using unobtrusive measures.
Similar to Rokeach (1973), he gave to student teachers
two sets of data.

In one, he depicted the median rank

ings of the values "Mature Love" and "A Sense of Ac
complishment" for a sample of Central Michigan University
student teachers.

Overall,

this student sample had

ranked "A Sense of Accomplishment" much higher than
"Mature love".

However,

the other table displayed the
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data as a function of their classification as either
having high or mediocre potential as teachers.

"Good"

teachers ranked "Mature Love" higher than "A Sense of
Accomplishment",

"Mediocre" teachers reversed the

rankings, putting "A Sense of Accomplishment" ahead of
"Mature Love".

Greenstein suggested to the subjects that

this data indicated that "good" teachers see mature love as
more important than a sense of professional accomplish
ment.

Control subjects saw tables depicting median

rankings of professors of education, and received no
information about the value systems of good or bad teach
ers .
Thirteen weeks after the treatment, all of the values
were ranked by all subjects.

The results showed that ex

perimental subjects ranked "Mature Love" significantly
higher than controls.

In addition, these subjects scored

higher than controls on a measure of teacher ability
scored by double blind judges.

These judges rated the

student teachers' abilities on a set of seven dimensions
including communication skills and overall teaching
potential.

Greenstein suggested that by making the

value "Mature Love" more important,

the subjects became

more personally concerned with the problems of others
and less concerned with personal achievement.

This
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value change altered the students' attitudes about
teaching and working with children, which was reflected
in their behavioral scores.
On the other hand, the influence of the reference
group could also explain these results.

The character

istics of "good" and "mediocre" teachers were clearly
specified.

So, whether subjects were able to perceive

the "hypocrisy" of rating "A Sense of Accomplishment"
above "Mature Love", or whether they were merely influenced
by the group with which they wished to identify ("good
teachers")

is unclear.

One purpose of this study, then was to attempt to
determine whether value change is a result of the aware
ness of inconsistencies between values and/or attitudes
and self-concept, or of information about the value sys
tem of a reference group with which the subject iden
tifies.

According to Rokeach, awareness of an inconsis

tency between values and self-concept is enough to arouse
self-dissatisfaction and to effect value change.

How

ever, if merely exposing subjects to the value rankings
of a positively perceived, reference group is sufficient
to effect change, then much of Rokeach’s work would be
more parsimoniously explained in terms of social influence
theory (Reiman,

1958).

In terms of this theory, the

subject comes to identify with the reference group
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because he "wants to establish or maintain a satisfying
self-defining relationship to another person or group"
(p. 53).

One way they maintain or establish this rela

tionship is by accepting attitudes, opinions, norms and
values of this reference group.

The specific value hier

archy to which they conform is irrelevant, so long as
they appear to the person to uphold his position as a
member of the group.

If subjects' values change, then,

it may be because they wish to conform to the values
of the reference group of which they perceive themselves
to be a part.
Of course, once the confounding effect of the ref
erence group was eliminated as an alternative explanation,
there was still the possibility that specific types of
inconsistencies, whether intrinsic or extrinsic could
be specified.

Perhaps the inconsistency must be linked

up with information concerning a reference group for
change to be realized.

However, Rokeach implies that the

mere presentation of an intrinsic inconsistency, with
no mention of a reference group, should be sufficient
to evoke value change.
tency is needed,

If only an intrinsic inconsis

then providing information concerning

a reference group might be pointless or could even
serve to interfere with the value change process.
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The second purpose of this study, then, was to attempt
to specify the differential effects of intrinsic and ex
trinsic inconsistencies with regard to value change.
In addition, the role of value change in behavior
change was reexamined.

Since Rokeach also states that

long-term behavioral change can only come about through
value change, the study of Rokeach's separate self-con
frontation manipulations was used to determine their
effects on long-term behavior change.
To determine the factors necessary to produce value
change and behavioral change, this study was composed
of five conditions:

1) an Intrinsic Inconsistency (II)

condition, comprising Rokeach’s first attempt to arouse
self-dissatisfaction by pointing out a simple inconsis
tency between values and self-concept;

2) a Reference

Group only (RG) condition, exposing subjects only to
data which identify value rankings of positively perceived
and negatively perceived reference groups;

3) an Ex

trinsic Inconsistency (El) condition, in which subjects
were provided with information on the value rankings of
a reference group and an inconsistency confrontation
based on the reference group’s values; 4) a Replication
(R) condition, which exposed subjects to all three of
Rokeach’s orjginal arousal manipulations, and 5) a
Control (C) condition which did not involve self

confrontation or reference group information of any kind.
Value change was measured by subjects' rankings on the
Rokeach Value Survey.

Since Rokeach states that value

change also results in long-term behavior change, a
measure of behavioral intention was made by telephone
two weeks after the value ranking procedure, as well as
a behavioral measure of value change.
It was, of course, expected that condition R, the
Replication condition, would result in significant value
change, since all three manipulations expected to produce
change were present.

This was also intended to confirm

the effects of Rokeach's overall procedure on value change
The patterns of results for other conditions were to be
used to either support Rokeach's theory, modify it,
or support reference group influence as an alternative
explanation:
1)

Self-confrontation theory would predict that the

two inconsistency conditions, II and El, would result
in greater value change than in the Control condition.
So both II and El should each produce self-dissatisfac
tion because these conditions contain self-confrontation
procedures which make subjects aware of inconsistency
between self-concept and values and/or attitudes.

Thus

10

it was reasoned that value change in conditions II and
El would confirm the predictions of self-confrontation
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theory.
2) If the conditions involving self-confrontation,
i.e., R, II and El, showed greater value change than
conditions RG and G, then Rokeach's explanation of the
data would be supported.

The former three conditions

all contain inconsistency manipulations, designed to
evoke self-dissatisfaction with subjects 1 value systems,
while conditions RG and C do not.

Thus, if only those

conditions which included inconsistency manipulations
were successful in bringing about value change, self
confrontation would apparently be a necessary condition
for change.

The reference group explanation would then

be’ a less viable alternative explanation.
3) If conditions containing reference group data,
R, RG and El showed greater value change than conditions
that did not, II and 0, then this would be evidence that
reference group influence is a viable explanation for the
value change found by Rokeach (1973).

In this case,

subjects could be sa.id to have responded to the social
influence pressure of a positively perceived reference
group.

The group influence explanation would be seen

to be more parsimonious because if group RG, which
contained subjects being exposed only to reference group
data, showed value change equivalent to the R or El
conditions, then the need for an inconsistency manipula
tion would have been obviated.
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4) Comparison of the two inconsistency conditions,
II and El, would provide a test of the relative strengths
of intrinsic and extrinsic inconsistencies.

If extrin

sic inconsistencies have stronger effects than intrinsic
inconsistencies,

then more needs to be done to under

stand the interrelationship,

if any, between group in

fluence and inconsistency effects.

That is, what does

group influence do to assure value change through confron
tation of inconsistency?

If intrinsic inconsistencies

have stronger effects than do extrinsic inconsistencies,
then Rokeach1s model of value modification can be oper
ationally simplified and be better understood in terms
of self-dissatisfaction with one's value system per se.
That is, if self-dissatisfaction can be caused by self
confrontation not involving group influence, then that
one maniptilation, based on inconsistency between one's
own values and self-concept,

is the major force involved

in change.
5) Finally,

the question of whether the- changing

of values is responsible for long-term behavioral change
was evaluated.

Behavior change was hypothesized to be

either a by-product of the value change effected by
reference group influence, or a naturp .1 extension of
value change, which had resulted from awareness of in
consistency and self-dissatisfaction.

In summary, existing attempts to demonstrate the
validity of Rokeach's theory have failed to eliminate
the possible confounding effect of reference group in
fluence.

Are subjects really seeing themselves as hypo

critical, and experiencing inconsistencies, or do they
just want to be like "everybody else"?

The major ques

tion in this study, then, was whether or not reference
group theory can explain Rokeach's results.

In addition,

this study attempted to isolate the specific manipula
tions combined by Rokeach in trying to arouse self
dissatisfaction, and to assess their impact indepen
dently on value and behavior change.

Method
Subjects
Subjects v/ere 207 undergraduates from lower-level
psychology and education classes.

All subjects were

run in the classroom situation.
Materials
Materials consisted of the Rokeach Value Survey,
Form E.

Form E of the Survey is simply an alphabetical

listing of the 18 terminal values derived by Rokeach.
Subjects are usually required to enter numbers to the
left of the values to reflect the rank-ordering they
wish represented.

Form E has demonstrated a test-

retest reliability of .7 4 , which has remained stable over
varying time periods as well as over populations (Ro
keach,

1 9 7 3 ).

Procedure
There were three phases to the study, each sep
arated by two-week periods.

Subjects were told at the

beginning of the Phase I session, and reminded at its
conclusion, that they had to be present at both of the
sessions in order to get credit for participation.
Phase I of the study involved the manipulation itself,
Phase II was the posttest, and Phase III consisted of the
behavioral), measures.
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Phase I .

Subjects were assigned to one of five

conditions by the random distribution of "Survey pack
ets".

Each subject packet was marked in order to iden

tify the experimental condition.

The subjects were told

that the study had to do with human values, and they
were asked to follow the instructions in the packet very
carefully.

Subjects were assured that all information

they provided as well as all survey data would be kept
in confidence.
1.

There were five conditions:
In the Replication (R) condition,

subjects were

essentially presented with the three manipulations used
in Rokeach’s original study (Rokeach,

1973)*

The issue

of equal rights for women was substituted for the civil
rights issue in order to make the manipulation more
relevant to subjects in 1 9 7 9 .
Subjects v/ere first exposed to a fictional presen
tation of a median rank ordering of values by "recent
LSU graduates".

An interpretation of this data was

suggested, with the implication of an intrinsic incon
sistency.
pretation.

Subjects were then asked to assess this inter
The instructions read as follows:
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Value Survey
This is a scientific study of value systems.
There are no right or wrong answers in this study.

The

best answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we
have already found out about the value systems of LSU
students.

I am sure that many of you would like to know

what they are.

Below is a list of 18 values in alpha

betical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative im
portance of these values to the LSU student population.
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students
here recently.

These students were asked to place a 1

next to the value which they thought most important to
them, a 2 next to the value which they thought second most
important, etc.

The value which they thought least

important was ranked 18th.
The numbers you see next to the values are the
average ranking received by each value from all the
students.
_1JL
1g

^

Please examine the list carefully.

Comfortable Life (a prosperous life)

An Exciting Life (a stimulating, active life)

6

A

Sense of Accomplishment (lasting contribution)

1Q

A

World at Peace (free of war and conflict)

17

A

World of Beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)
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9

Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
Family Security (taking care of loved ones)

1__ Freedom (independence, free choice)
2

Happiness (contentedness)

8

Inner Harmony (freedom from inner conflict)

5_ Mature Love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
16

National Security (protection from attack)

18

Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life)

14

-Salvation (saved, eternal life)

15

Social Recognition (respect, admiration)

_4_
7
3_

Self-Respect (self-esteem)
True Friendship (close companionship)
Wisdom (mature understanding of life)
One of the most interesting findings here is that the

students, on the average, felt that Freedom was very
important.--they ranked it 1; but they felt that Equality
was considerably less important— they ranked it 1 1 .
Apparently, LSU students value freedom far more highly
than they value equality.

This suggests that LSU stu

dents in general are much more interested in their own
freedom than they are in freedom for other people.
Think about this for a few moments.
do you agree with this interpretation?

How strongly
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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Strongly

11
Strongly

Agree

Disagree
(Check one)

We have one other finding which we think is unusu
ally interesting.

In order to make this finding more

meaningful to you personally, you should first answer
honestly the following question on women's rights:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
Yes, and

I have personally worked for

the Amendment.

Yes, hut

I have not personally worked

for the

Amendment.
No.
The 298 students who participated in the previous
study of value systems were asked this same question.
They were divided into three groups, according to how they
responded.

The table below shows the average rankings

of the values Freedom and Equality for each of these
three groups.
AVERAGE RANKINGS OF FREEDOM &
EQUALITY BY LSU STUDENTS
Yes, worked for ERA

Yes, didn't work for
ERA

No

Freedom

6

1

2

Equality

5

11

17
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Notice in the table that:
1.

Pro- and anti- ERA students all value freedom

relatively highly.

Of 18 values all groups rank Freedom

among the top six.
2.

Students who are strongly for ERA value Equality

rather highly— they ranked it 5.

But those against

ERA place a much lower value on Equality— they ranked it
17.

Those who are sympathetic hut non-participants

ranked Equality 11.
Apparently, both freedom and equality are important
to some people, while to others freedom is very important
but equality is not.

This raises the question whether

those who are against ERA are really saying that they care
a great deal about their own freedom but are indifferent
to other people’s freedom.

Those who are for

ERA

are perhaps really saying they not only want freedom
for themselves but for other people too. What do you
think?

1
1 strongly

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

(check one)

agree with this interpretation.

9

10

11
I strongly
disagree.
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This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to be
valid in this study, you must be here for the second
phase which will be in two weeks.

We thank you and

hope this has been an interesting and instructive ex
perience for you.
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Subjects' agreement with the experimental manip
ulation messages was measured to assure that subjects
did not undergo value change merely because they agreed
with the persuasive message, but because they had ex
perienced cognitive inconsistency.
Exposure of subjects to the table of 18 values
with the sample median rankings, as well as the ac
companying message amounted to the intrinsic inconsis
tency manipulation.

Exposure to the ranking-ERA data

with accompanying analysis and interpretation made up
the extrinsic inconsistency manipulation.

Here, it

was suggested that those with attitudes against ERA
held inconsistent values, while those subjects who
were pro-ERA held values which are consistent,
2.

In the Intrinsic Inconsistency (II) condition,

subjects were exposed to the first of Rokeach's three
manipulations.

That is, they saw the list of median rank

ings of the 298 LSU students for all 18 values and read
the interpretation suggesting that these students are
more interested in freedom for themselves than they are
for other people.

Then, they indicated to what extent

they agreed or disagreed with this interpretation.
They also indicated their attitudes regarding ERA.
They did not see any data depicting these students'
value rankings categorized by positions on the ERA
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question.

Nor were they exposed to the manipulation

of extrinsic inconsistency,(see Appendix A).
3.

In the Reference Group only (RG) condition,

subjects received the same initial instructions as the
two groups above, except that the median rankings of the
LSU student sample was not given.

Instead, subjects

were informed that the values had been ranked previously
by a group of LSU students, and then the list of values
and definitions was presented without the median rankings.
They then made an attitudinal commitment on the ERA
question.

following this, subjects were shown the table

of median rankings for the student sample, tabulated
for each of the three positions:

I support ERA and have

worked for its passage, 1 support ERA but have not worked
for it, or I do not support ERA.

This table indicated

that students who support and worked for ERA ranked
Equality 5, those who supported it but did not work
for it ranked Equality 11, and those against ERA ranked
it 17.

In addition,

it was specifically pointed out

that subjects who support ERA rank Equality high, while
those opposed to ERA rank Equality relatively low.
Conceptually, subjects were being informed of typical val
ue rankings for various reference groups, including a
'J

group they perceived positively and one they perceived
negatively.

There was no manipulation of inconsistency

(see Appendix B) .

4.

The Extrinsic Inconsistency (El) condition

subjects were exposed to the identical initial instruc
tions as the RG- condition,
out rankings.

including the value list with

They made an attitudinal commitment on

ERA, and then saw not only the table of median rankings
of the values as a function of the sample students'
positions on ERA, but also, unlike the RG condition,
a self-eonfrontative interpretation of this data.

It

suggested that those who are against ERA are really say
ing that they care a great deal about their own freedom
but are indifferent to the freedom of other people, and
that those who are for ERA are saying they not only want
freedom for themselves, but for other people too.
Subjects then stated their agreement with the interpret
ation on an 11-point scale (see Appendix C ) .
5.

Control subjects got the same introductory

information as the two groups above, and made an atti
tudinal commitment on ERA.

Eo data were shown them,

nor were any implications made.

At that point, control

subjects rank ordered the values on the Value Survey.
These data sei-ved as the basis of comparison with the
posttest scores of the experimental groups.
Phase I I .

All subjects completed the Rokeach

Value Survey, Eorm P; (see Appendix D ) .

Afterwards, all
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subjects were told:
This is the end of the study.

The purpose

and results of the study will be explained
to you in class, after all the results have
been analyzed, probably in a few weeks.
Thank you for your participation.
Phase I I I .

In an effort to assess the behavioral

impact of the treatments, an attempt was made to contact
all subjects who had responded favorably on the ERA
question by telephone two weeks after the posttest.
A female experimental confederate made the following
solicitation:
Hello,

is this ____ ?

This is ____ .

I am working for the League of Women Voters
of Baton Rouge.

We're trying to find out by

telephone survey how the citizens feel about
the Equal Rights Amendment.

Could you tell

me whether or not you support the Amendment?
(If for it) We have prepared some letters on
behalf of the ERA which we'd like to send to
state legislators.

All you have to do is to

sign the letter and send it in to us.
Would you be willing to do that?
Thank you.

Goodbye.
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Subjects who responded with either an intent to
sign the letter or an "undecided" were sent the following
letter on plain stationery, along with a stamped envelope
addressed to the local office of the League of Women
Voters, and labeled "ERA Project":
November 25, 1979
Dear Louisiana Legislator,
I would like to urge you to support the
Equal Rights Amendment passage in the Louisiana
Legislature.

A "yes" vote for ERA would insure

a majority of our population equal participa
tion in American society.

Women, like their

male counterparts, should be judged by the
law as individuals, not as a class of inferior
beings.

It is important to note that the only

kind of sex discrimination which ERA would
forbid is that which exists in l a w .

Inter

personal relationships and customs of chivalry
will remain as they always have been, a matter
of choice.

Indeed, it would give new dignity

to these important roles by confirming equality
of rights regardless of sex, and upholding
an individual's right to choose his/her place
in society.
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As a legislator (sic), I encourage your vigorous
and effective support of the Equal Rights Amend
ment in words and in action.
Sincerely yours,

The subjects were also sent the following cover let
ter on League stationery, which was signed by the local
chapter president:.
November 12, 1979
Lear Friend,
Thank you so much for taking the time to speak
to our representative the other evening.
Enclosed you will find a letter,,copies of
which we are sending out to other ERA sup
porters like yourself throughout the state.
We would like you to please sign the letter
and send it back to us in the accompanying
stamped, self-addressed envelope.

There are

certain time constraints on us, so please try
to send the letter back to us _no later than
Monday, November 1 9 .

All letters received

will be forwarded together to various leaders
in the Louisiana House and Senate, as well as
to other legislators.

Thank you so much for

your support.

Working together we can win!

Sincerely,
Marilyn P. Barfield
President
The two measures employed to evaluate the effec
value change on Behavior were:
1.

the differential rate of the response
of intent to sign the letter over the
five conditions, and

2.

the actual differential rate of return
of signed letters to the League office.
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Results
A total of 207 students in three classes completed
both Phases I and. II of the study.

Of these, a total

of 115 subjects (56%), when asked if they supported
the ERA, responded,
the Amendment.1'

"Yes, but I have not worked for

One student responded that she both

supported and had worked for the Amendment, and 91
students (44%) reported that they did not support the
Amendment.

Since only those who supported the ERA

but had not worked for it were deemed acceptable as
subjects to test the present hypotheses, the data obtained
from the students in the latter two categories were not
included in the analysis.

In addition, to counteract

any potential biasing effect of the comparatively large
female/male ratio in the Control condition,

six females

were randomly drawn from the Control condition and
excluded from the analysis.

Attempts were made to

recontact only the remaining 109 subjects for Phase
III.

Of these 109 subjects employed in the analysis,

60 (56%) were females while 49 (44%) were males.

The

cell frequencies according to sex are recorded in Table
1

.
To confirm the relative stability of rankings over

time, a t-test was performed to determine whether or not
there v/as a significant difference between pretest and
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Table 1
Cell Frequencies by Sex and Condition

Condition

Females

Males

El

12

8

II

10

10

R

14

11

EG

11

12

C

13

8

60

49
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posttest rankings for the Control group.

Mean Equality

scores for pretest (x = 11.81) were not significantly
different from posttest rankings (x = 10.90), t (20) =
0.97, p - .34.

Similarly, mean Freedom scores for

pretest (x = 5.95) did not differ significantly from
posttest scores (x = 6.19), t (20) = -.30, p = .77.
Thus rankings of Equality and Freedom appear to be stable
over time when no intervention occurs. For the remainder
of the analysis, pretest scores for the Control condition
were utilized since they, as in other conditions, were
subjects' first exposure to the ranking task.
Means and standard deviations were calculated for
subjects' post-manipulation rankings of the values Equal
ity and Freedom (see Table 2).
Analyses of variance were performed on the value
data.

The analysis was designed to answer certain

research questions by comparing means of value ranking
scores.
Rather than testing an overall main effect with a
one-way analysis of variance, a series of four a priori
contrasts were performed on the ranking data.

The re

sults of these contrasts are found in Table 3.
First, if Rokeach's theory were correct, it was
expected that mean rankings in the Replication (R)
condition would be significantly higher than in the
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of
Value Rankings

Condition
Replication

Mean

S.D.

n

10.56

3.94

25

5.84

4.34

25

Equality

8.40

5.14

20

Freedom

5.75

4.83

. 20

10.78

4.87

23

5.96

5.47

23

Equality

11.10

5.42

20

Freedom

7.05

4.27

20

Equality

11 .90

4.13

21

5.95

3.94

21

Equality
Freedom
intrinsic Inconsistency

Reference Group only
Equality
Freedom
ixtrinsic Inconsistency

ontrol

Freedom

v
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance:
Equality

Source (Contrast)

df

MS

F

2

BG + Control vs. others

1

45.71

2.07

.15

II + Control vs. others

1

11.16

0.51

.48

El vs. II

1

72.90

3.30

.07

K vs. Control

1

20.64

0.93

.34

104

22.08

Error
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Control (C) condition.

The Control group had been ex

posed to no self-confrontation manipulation, while the
R condition subjects had apparently been exposed to three
self-confrontation manipulations.

When this hypothesis

was tested by a contrast between the R and C conditions,
no differences were found, F (1, 104) = 0.93, p = .34.
However, it will be noted from Table 2 that the means
(xp•= 10.56, x^ = 11.90) were in the expected direction;
the mean rank for the R condition was higher than the
mean rank for the G condition.
Secondly, based on Rokeach’s theory, it was pre
dicted that those conditions containing self-confronta
tions would have significantly higher value rankings
than those that did not.

That is, the combined mean

ranking of conditions II, El and R should be signif
icantly higher than the mean ranking of conditions
EG- and 0.

This contrast provides a direct test of the

overall difference between conditions containing self
confrontation manipulations and those that do not.
Although the means were again in the expected di
rection (xT-r .-,T 0 = 10.06, xD - n
II+EI+H
Rbr+C

11.31), the contrast
’

was not significant, 1 (1, 104) = 2.07, p = .15.
Thus the results predicted by Self-confrontation theory
were not supported,
The alternative explanation for the results of
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Rokeach’s research was based on the influence of ref
erence groups.

If this explanation were valid, subjects

would not so much have experienced self-dissatisfaction
from self-confrontation, but rather, identified with a
positively perceived reference group, about which in
formation was given in conditions R, RG- and El.

Thus,

it was predicted that conditions containing information
from potential reference groups, i.e., R, RG- and El,
to have mean rankings that were significantly higher
than those that did not, i.e., conditions II and C.
Again, no significant effect was found for this con
trast, E (1,104) = 0.51» P = .48.

In fact, the means

were nearly identical; the combined means for reference
group conditions was 10.79, while that for non-reference
group conditions was 10.19.

Thus, no evidence was

found for the influence of reference groups in the
Rokeach paradigm.
It was postulated that intrinsic and extrinsic
inconsistencies might differ in their impact upon value
change.

bhen II was compared to El, the difference

approached significance, F (1, 104) = 3-30, p = .07;
the Intrinsic Inconsistency condition had the greater'
impact on the ranking of the value Equality,

as

can

be seen in Table 2, the mean of the II condition
(x = 8.4) represents the highest ranking, and the mean
of the El condition (x = 11.1) represents the next to
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lowest ranking of Equality (the lowest being that of
the Control condition).
Based on these findings, three additional post-hoc
comparisons were made, utilizing Dunn's Bonferroni t
(Dunn,

1961).

First, the II condition was compared to

the Control condition in an effort to ascertain the
impact, if any, of the intrinsic inconsistency manip
ulation on value change.

It was found that the II con

dition (x = 8.4) had a significantly higher mean ranking
than the Control condition (x = 11.9), Fpurm (1, 104) =
6.03, p <

.05.

Secondly, in order to determine the

possible effect of the extrinsic inconsistency manip
ulation, the El condition (x = 11.1) was compared with
the Control condition, but no significant difference
was found, F-j)Urm 0 »

104) = .32, p = n.s.

Thus it was

concluded that the intrinsic inconsistency manipulation
had effected value change, while the extrinsic incon
sistency manipulation had not.
An additional comparison was performed to determine
if the Reference Croup only condition had undergone
value change.

Again, no significant difference was

Fn
(1, 104)
Dunn v r
'

= 0.62, p = n.s.
’ *

To summarize the results of

found,

the analysis of the

value Equality, the order of mean rankings in decreasing
order were:
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Intrinsic Inconsistency (II), Replication (R), Reference
Group only (RG), Extrinsic Inconsistency (El) and fi
nally, the Control condition.

The ranking of Equality

was found to be significantly higher in the II con
dition than in the Control condition.

No other con

ditions differed significantly from the Control condition,
but the difference between the II and El conditions did
approach significance.
Since, as previously reported,

it was necessary to

exclude six females at random from the Control condition,
a statistical analysis was done in order to insure that
results were not due to the unequal distributions of males
and females across conditions.

That is, it was neces

sary to confirm that the difference between the II and
Control conditions was not due to the disproportionate
ly greater number of females than males in the Control
condition.

The analysis was accomplished by performing

a test of simple effects.

In a pair of contrasts the

II condition was compared to the Control condition for
female subjects, and then again for male subjects.
It was reasoned that if the II condition differed from
the C condition only for females and not for males,
then there would be reason to believe that the differ
ential frequency of males and females in the II and C
conditions might be confounding the effect of the manip
ulation.

Ironically, when the contrasts were performed,
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it was found that it was the males in the II condition,
rather than the females,that showed significantly higher
rankings than those in the Control condition.

For

males, the mean ranking for Equality in the II condi
tion (x = 7.9) was significantly higher than that of
the controls (x = 13.0).

Thus clearly, the dispropor

tionate number of females in the Control•coadition
in no way contributed to the significant difference be
tween the II and C conditions in the value ranking of
Equality.
The experimental manipulations were not expected
to affect the value Freedom, as Freedom was seen as the
more stable value.

To confirm this, an analysis iden

tical to that performed on the Equality data was per
formed on the Freedom data (see Table 4).

As can be

seen from the table, none of the contrasts either achieved
or approached significance.

Post-hoc comparisons ana

logous to those in the Equality analysis were performed,
and again no significant results were found.

II com

pared to the Control condition yielded no significant
difference, P n .

(1, 104) = 0.02, p > .10.

Similar-

ly, the comparison of El vs. C as well as that of RG
vs. 0 were both not significant. Apparently, there
was no impact of self-confrontation or reference gx'oup
influence on ranking of the value Freedom.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance:
Freedom

Source (Contrast)

df

MS

RG- + Control vs. others

1

1.75

0.08

.77

II + Control vs. others

1

4.73

0.22

.64

El vs. II

1 16.90

0.79

.37

R vs. Control

1

0.01

.93

Error

0.14

104 21 .27

F

£
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Additionally, for the El and II conditions, Pearson
Product-Moment correlations were calculated to determine
the relationships between the value rankings and measures
of subject agreement with the arguments contained in the
confrontation manipulations.

In Rokeach's (1973) study

this analysis had been conducted in order to insure that
value change occurred because subjects experienced selfdissatisfaction, and not because they agreed with the
persuasive message.

He found that overall, experimental

subjects changed value rankings regardless of whether or
not they agreed with the message,

i.e., no correlation

between value rankings and agreement was found.
In this study subjects indicated the magnitude of
their agreement with the data interpretation supplied in
the material.

The Likert-type scale ranged from "I

strongly agree with this interpretation" (1) to "I
strongly disagree with this interpretation" (11).
Analysis revealed that in the El condition subject agree
ment with the interpretation correlated significantly
with value rankings of Equality, r (19) = .56, p = .01.
Conversely,

in the II condition,

subject agreement with

the message interpretation did not correlate with value
rankings of Equality, r (19) = -.12, p = n.s.

For the

value Freedom, neither rankings of El or II conditions
correlated significantly with subject agreement, r ’s (19)
- .15 and .01, respectively.
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Finally, there was an attempt to determine the
relationship between subjects' rankings of Equality
and relevant behavioral measures.

Rokeach (1973)

had originally predicted that any change in values effec
ted by self-confrontation manipulations would itself
effect a change in behavior relevant to that value.
It was also expected that any change resulting from
reference group pressure would also result in behavior
change, since subjects* behavior would tend to be consis
tent with newly changed values.
The behavioral measures included a statement of
intent to sign a pro-ERA letter, and the actual return
of that letter by mail to league of Women Voters head
quarters.

Only 76 of 109 subjects were successfully

contacted by phone by the experimenter’s assistant.
Of these, 59 said they would sign the letter (positive
intent),

12 said they would not (negative intent), and

five were undecided and wanted to see the letter before
committing themselves.

14 of 15 subjects from the II

condition made known positive intentions,
from the RG condition,

13 of 17 did so

12 of 14 from the R condition,

11 of 14 from the Control condition and 9 of 16 from the
El condition.
Unfortunately, expected frequencies in 67% of the
cells were below five, and thus a 3 X 5 Chi-square test
of independence was decided against.

Subsequently,
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a chi-square test corrected, .for continuity was performed
on a contingency table containing frequencies of "Yes"
responses compared with "No" and "Undecided" responses.
Since, apparently, only the II condition resulted in
value change, the test compared the II condition with
all other conditions.
3

= 0,15, p = n.s.

No significant effect was found,

A Fisher Exact test was then done

to compare the frequencies of the II and Control con
ditions.

Again, no significant relationship was found.

The purpose of measuring the return rate of the
letters was to further gauge the extent of commitment to
the ERA as a function of value change.

Of 64 letters

sent to those subjects who had stated their intent to
sign the letters,

23 were returned to the League office

signed, and 41 were never returned.

No letters were

returned by subjects who had been "Undecided1s" with
respect to intent to sign.

Seven of 14 subjects in the

II condition returned signed letters, five of 15 in the
RG- condition, four of nine in the El condition, four of
11 in the Control condition and three of 12 in the
Replication condition.

Since most of the expected values

for the cell frequencies were below five, no analysis
could be performed on this measure.

Nevertheless, it

is noteworthy that the II condition had both highest
proportion of intent as well as highest proportion of
returns of all five conditions.

Discussion
This study attempted to evaluate the self-confront
ation hypothesis described by Rokeach (1973) in the
light of an alternative interpretation of value change
based on reference group influence as suggested by the
work of Xelman (1958) and others.

Certain alternatives

were put forth and examined.
Rokeach (1973) found that subjects’ value rank
ings for the value Equality increased significantly when
subjects were exposed to a self-confrontation manipula
tion.

Virtually this same manipulation, with the ex

ception of the issue employed (ERA as opposed to civil
rights) was used in an attempt to replicate Rokeach's
findings.

It was predicted that if Rokeach’s theory

were valid, then the Replication (R) condition would
have a significantly higher mean ranking for Equality
than would the Control (C) condition.

This was not

found to be the case, as no significant difference was
found.

Thus the present study was not successful in

replicating Rokeach's (1973) findings.
In seeking to discuss the implications of this
inability to replicate Rokeach's result,

it may be use

ful to consider possible "dynamics" of the effects of
Rokeach-type manipulations on subjects.

For example,

rather than adding to the impact of a previous inconsis
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tency manipulation, an extrinsic inconsistency manip
ulation might actually detract from the overall effect.
The present data would seem to support this contention.
Even though the presence of an intrinsic inconsistency
successfully elicited value change in the II condition,
this same manipulation had a negligible effect in the
Replication condition.

Apparently, the extrinsic incon

sistency manipulation in the R condition served to
somehow neutralize or counteract the impact of the in
trinsic inconsistency.
A possible explanation for the absence of value
change in the Replication condition would be simply an
excess of information.

Subjects being presented with

both data tables (which Rokeach himself admits are hard
ly very stimulating to college studenxs) and both con
frontation manipulations may have been less able to
comprehend the logical connections between the self
dissatisfaction arguments and their implications for
the value rankings of Freedom and Equality.
Another reason why the El component of the Repli
cation manipulation may have hindered value change
is that the issue of ERA may not be as conceptually close
to the value Equality as was the issue of civil rights
for Rokeach’s subjects.

That is, civil rights may be

a more defensible issue for subjects, and they would be

more likely to develop self-dissatisfaction over their
perceived inconsistency with this issue, then with ERA.
It is noteworthy that Rokeach*s study was done at
a time and location which may have been conducive to the
kind of value modification which Rokeach was attempting.
At a more liberal institution such as Michigan State,
in the time of the late 6 G ’s, the extrinsic inconsis
tency involving ERA might well have had a significantly
greater impact than it did on this relatively conserv
ative campus.

That is, the ERA argument might be more

likely to create self-dissatisfaction at a more liberal
institution.
Reference group influence was postulated as a pos
sible alternative explanation for the results of Rokeach*
test of his theory.

According to Kelman (1958) and

ethers, subjects may be said to respond to the social
influence pressure of a positively perceived reference
group.

If subjects exposed only to reference group

data and not to a self-confrontation manipulation showed
value change equivalent to the R or El conditions, then
the need for an inconsistency manipulation and resultant
self-dissatisfaction would be obviated.

It was thus

predicted that if the reference group theory were valid,
then the combined mean of conditions R, RG and El (the
three conditions containing reference group material)
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would show a significantly higher ranking than would
the mean of conditions II and Control (which do not con
tain any reference group material).

This, too was not

found to he the case as the contrast was not significant.
When the RG condition was independently compared with
the Control condition, it also was not found to differ
significantly, although the rankings were in the predicted
direction.

It appears that this study provides little

evidence for a Reference Group interpretation of the
Rokeach paradigm.

That is, there are no indications

from the present data that reference group influence
alone results in value change.
The qualitative differences between intrinsic ana
extrinsic inconsistencies suggested that they might have
differential impacts on value change.

Extrinsic incon

sistencies emphasize the role of group influence in the
modification of subjects' values.

Intrinsic inconsis

tencies appear free of sources of group influence.
In fact, the II condition is seen as the purest and most
direct self-confrontation manipulation presented in Ro
keach 's original persuasive communication material;
operationally,
concepts.

it is closest to Rokeach’s theoretical

Comparing the effects of these manipulations

could therefore be seen as another indirect comparison
of the Geli-confrontation and Reference Group explanations
of the original Rokeach findings.
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Explicit in Rokeach's theory is the notion that
any self-confrontation procedure which makes subjects
aware of inconsistencies between self-concept and values
should result in self-dissatisfaction and thus value
change.

Both the Extrinsic and Intrinsic Inconsistency

conditions contained self-confrontation manipulations
utilized by Rokeach, and thus were both theoretically
capable of eliciting value change.

It was therefore

predicted that both the El and II-conditions would show
higher value rankings than the Control condition,
Rokeach's theory were correct.

if

The II condition was

indeed significantly higher, while the El condition
was not.

The difference between the II and El condi-r-

ticns approached significance.

The comparison of the

El condition with the II condition indicated that the
II condition contained the highest of the five mean
rankings, while the El condition had the lowest ranking
of the four experimental conditions; the only condition
with a lower ranking was the Control condition.

The

results suggest that the II manipulation had a positive
impact on value change while the El manipulation had
little or no effects.
The results strongly suggest that contrary to Ro
keach's implication that self-confrontation manipula
tions are additive,

this does not appear to be so.
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following his first self-confrontation manipulation
(our II), Rokeach felt it necessary to "arouse an
additional state of dissatisfaction"

(Rokeach,

1973,

p. 237), by adding what amounted to our El manipulation.
Yet the only condition that was found to effect value
change was the one with only a single self-dissatisfac
tion-arousing message.

The II condition's single manip

ulation was more effective than was the R condition’s
two .
Apparently, not all "seif-confrohtation" manipula
tions effectively make differences between the value
system and self-concept salient enough to have an .impact
on value change.

In this case, an extrinsic inconsistency,

which utilised information about the values of an exter
nal source in order to point out the inconsistency, was
net. successful in eliciting value change.

On the other

hand, an intrinsic inconsistency, which was derived from
subjects' own value systems and self-concepts, success
fully effected an increase in the importance of the value
Equality.

Thus it would seem that Rokeach's theory

could be modified to emphasize the impact of intrinsic
inconsiscencies which are devoid of the apparently in
effectual use of information concerning the values of
external sources.
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Curiously, the data indicated a significant pos
itive correlation, for El subjects, between value rank
ings of Equality and subjects' agreement with the El
message.

This agreement measure was used as a device by

Rokeach to insure that subjects were actually feeling
self-dissatisfaction, as opposed to becoming convinced
by the veracity of the message.

Here, apparently, the

few subjects in this condition who changed did so as a
result of the persuasive influence of the message, which
is what Rokeach assumed would not happen.

Rokeach (1973)

has pointed out that "Significant changes in values and
attitudes were found about as often and to about the
same extent among experimental subjects, regardless of
variations in their...agreement with the experimenter's
interpretation..." (p. 300).
Eor II subjects, a non-significant negative corre
lation was found between value rankings of Equality and
subjects' agreement with the II manipulation.

It may

be inferred from this that the higher mean ranking in
this condition was not a result of subjects' being
convinced of the veracity of the II argument.

In fact,

there was no relationship between agreement and value
change.

Therefore, indications are that only the II

condition subjects underwent self-dissatisfaction and
this self-dissatisfaction was responsible for the value
change.

Subjects in the El condition, who did not un
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dergo self-dissatisfaction, may have been in agreement
with the persuasive message, but this apparently did
not have the long-term impact necessary to affect value
change.
finally, an attempt was made to assess the impact
of value change on subsequent behavioral change.

It

was hypothesized that those conditions in which value
change was evident would show a significantly greater
number of subjects willing to act on their egalitarian
values.

That is, subjects in these conditions would be

more willing to sign a letter endorsing ERA.

Since

this measure only involved intent and not public be
havior, an attempt was made to determine if intent to
sign would result in the actual signing and returning
of the letter.

Thus, it was hypothesized that these

conditions would have a significantly greater number
of signed, returned letters than conditions not showing
value change.
Although the II condition, the only one to have dem
onstrated significant value change, had

the greatest

proportion of stated intentions as well as actual let
ters returned,

there were no significant differences

among the conditions.

Apparently, the value change

manipulation was either too weak to have a meaningful
impact on behavior,

or else it was not durable enough
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to maintain itself during the extended pre-measure per
iod.

It is also possible that the letter-signing

task was not representative of behaviors dictated by
an egalitarian self-concept.

At any rate, it may be

concluded here that there is little apparent behavior
change effected by the modification of subjects' values
by self-confrontation procedures.
It is unclear as to why the value change effect
that was found did not extend to the behavioral measures.
It was originally believed that despite traditionally
low return rates of mailed survey material,

subjects

ranking Equality high relative to controls would be more
likely to both express a willingness to sign pro-ERA
material and to act upon that commitment.

Perhaps,

subjects do not extend their concept of equality to
the Equal Rights Amendment.

In any case, if it is as

sumed that value change has indeed taken place here,
then it must be considered that behaviors may be in
consistent with values, much as rhey are often incon
sistent with attitudes.

Theoretically,

some sort of

"balance" concept might apply which could explain such
"value-discrepant" behavior.
The present study has attempted to either extend or
modify Rokeach's self-confrontation theory of value
change.

The data suggest that while there seems to be

little evidence for a reference group influence expla
nation of Rokeach-type effects, there does seem to he
some evidence for the self-dissatisfaction construct
which Rokeach employs to explain his theory.

However,

the outcomes of such value change attempts seem to hinge
on the type of message employed.

Intrinsic inconsisten

cies, which are those derived solely from the subject’s
own value system and self-concept, seem to have greater
impact on value change than do extrinsic inconsistencies,
which take into account information based on an external
source in its inconsistency.

V/hile it has been sugges

ted that intrinsic inconsistencies result in greater self
dissatisfaction than do extrinsic inconsistencies, the
reasons for this and the variables affecting each type
of.' inconsistency may generate future research.
In addition, value change that does take place seems
to have little impact on behavior change.

It is possible

that such behavior changes based on alterations of value
systems may be largely dependent on such variables as
the subject’s perceived relevance of the issue to the
value, and the extent to which subjects are themselves
ego-involved, with the issue.

future research might

examine this paradigm by manipulating different issues
and subjects’ potential involvement with them.

Reference Notes
1.

Conroy, W.J., Katkin, P. S.

and Barnette, V/.L.

Modification of smoking behavior by Rokeach's Self
confrontation technique.

Paper presented at the an

nual meetings of the Southeastern Psychological
Association in hew Orleans, April 7, 1973*
2.

Hollen, C.C.

Value change, perceived instrument

ality, and attitude change.

Unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation, Michigan State University Library,
1972.

74

References
Abeison, R.P.

& Rosenberg, N.J.

Symbolic psycho-logic:

A model of attitudinal cognition.
1958, 2»

Behavioral Science,

1-13.

Aronson, E.

The theory of cognitive dissonance:

current perspective.

In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances

in Experimental Social Psychology.
demic Press,
Cook, T.D.

New York:

Flay, B.R.

The persistence of experimen
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology.
Academic Press,

.Dunn, O.J.

Aca

1969.

tally induced attitude change.

York:

A

New

1978.

Multiple comparisons among means.

Journal

of the American Statistical Association, 1961, 56,
52-64.
Fesfinger5 L.

A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.

Evanston, 111.:
Pi shoe in, M.

& Ajzen, I.

and Behavior:

frontation:

Belief, Attitude, Intention

An Introduction to Theory and Research.

Reading, Mass.:
Greensxein, T.

Row, Peterson, 1957.

Addison-V/esley, 1975.

Behavior change through value self-con
a field experiment.

Journal of Personal

ity and Social Psychology, 1976, 34, 254-262.

75

Heider,

P.

The Ps yc ho l o g y of In terpe rs on al [Relations.

New York:

vviiey, 1958.

Hovland, C .1.,(Ed .) , The Order of Presentation in Per
suasion .
Kelman, H.C.
alization:

New Haven:

Yale University Press,

Compliance,

1957.

identification, and intern

three processes of attitude change.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1958, 2 , 51-60.
McGuire, N.J.

A syllogistic analysis of cognitive

relationships.

In M.J.

Rosenberg, et a l . (Eds.),

Attitude Organization and Change.
University Press,
Newcomb, T.M.
S.
Vol.

Osgood, C.E.

Individual systems of orientation.

New York:

McGraw-Hill,

& Tannenbaum, P.H.

chological Review, 1955, 6 2 ,

1959.

The principle of con-

Rokeach, M.

Psy

42-55.

The Nature of Human Values.

The Pree Press,

In

A Study of a Science.

gruity in the prediction of attitude change.

Rokeach, M.

Yale

1960.

Koch (Ed.), Psychology:
3.

New Haven:

New York:

1973.

Long-term value change initiated by com

puter feedback.

Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 1975, .32, 467-476.
Rokeach, M .

S: Cochrane,

R.

Self-confrontation and

confrontation with another as determinants of long-

77
chology, 1972, 2, 283-292.
Rokeach, M.

& McClellan, L.D.

Feedback of information

about the values and attitudes of self and others as
determinants of long-term cognitive and behavioral
change.

Journal of Applied Social Psychology,

1972, 2, 236-251.
Secord, P.F.

& Packman, W.

to personality.

In B .A .

An interpersonal approach
Maher (Ed.), Progress in

Experimental Personality Research,
York:

Vol. 2.

New

Academic Press, 1965.

vVicker, A.W.

Attitudes versus actions:

The relationship

of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude
objects.

Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25., 41-78.

Appendix A

Instructions for Intrinsic Inconsistency Condition
This is a scientific study of value systems.
are no right or wrong answers in this study.

There

The best

answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we
have already found out about the value systems of LSU
students.

I am sure that many of you would like to

know what they are.

Below is a list of 18 values in

alphabetical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative im
portance of these values to the LSU student population.
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students
here recently.

These students were asked to place a

one next to the value which they thought most important
Jtlierri, a two next to the value which they thought
second most important, etc.

The value which they thought

least important was ranked 18th.
The numbers you see next to the values are the av
erage ranking received by each value from all the stu
dents.

Please examine the list carefully.
(Value list with ranks)

One of the most interesting findings here is that
the students, on the average, felt that Freedom was very
important— they ranked it one; but they felt that Equal
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ity was considerably less .important— they ranked it 11.
Apparently, LSU students value freedom far more highly
than they value equality.

This suggests that LSU stu

dents in general are much more interested in their own
freedom than they are in freedom for other people.
Think about this for a few moments.

How strongly

do you agree with this interpretation?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

(check one)
Strongly agree

strongly disagree

Would you please answer honestly the following
question in a related area:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
Yes, and I have personally worked for the Amendment.
Yes, but I have not personally worked for the
Amendment.
No.
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
remind you that in order for your participation to be
valid in this study, you must be here for the second
phase which will be in two weeks.

We thank you and

nope this has been an interesting and instructive ex
perience for you.

We

Appendix B

Instructions for Reference Group only Condition
This is a scientific study of value systems.
There are no right or wrong answers in this study.
The best answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we
have already found out about the value systems of LSU
students.

I am sure that many of you would like to know

what they are.

Below is a list of 18 values in alpha

betical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative imporxance of these values to the LSU student population.
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students
here recently.

These students were asked to place a one

next to the value which they thought most important to
th e m , a two next to the value which they thought second
most important, etc.

The value which they thought least

important was ranked 18 t h .

Please examine the list

carefully.
(Value list without ranks)
Now, would you please answer honestly the following
question in a related area;
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
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Yes,

and I have personally worked for the Amendment.

Yes,

hut I have not personally worked .for the

Amendment.
Wo.
The 298 students in the study described above were
asked this same question.

The students1 results were

divided into 3 groups, according to how they responded.
The table below shows the average ranking of the values
Freedom and Equality for each of these three groups:
AVERAGE RANKINGS OE FREEDOM & EQUALITY
_____________ BY LSU STUDENTS______________
Yes, & have worked

Yes, but have not worked

No

for the Amendment________ for the Amendment_______________
Freedom

6

1

2

Equality

5

11

17

Notice in the table that:
1)

Pro- and anti- ERA students all value
freedom relatively highly.

Of 18 values

all groups rank Freedom among the top six.
2}

Students who are strongly

for FRA value

Equality rather highly— they ranked it five.
But those against ERA place a much lower
value on Equality--they ranked it 17-

Those

who are non-participants but sympathetic
ranked Equality 11.
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Think about these results for a few moments.
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to
be valid in this study, you must be here for the second
phase which will be in two v/eeks.

We thank you and hope

this has been an interesting and instructive experience
for you.

App e n d i x G

Instructions for Extrinsic Inconsistency Condition
This is a scientific study of value systems.
are no right or wrong answers in this study.

There

The best

answer is your own personal opinion.
We would first like to tell you some things we
have already found out about the value systerns of LSU
students.

I am sure that many of you would like to know

what they are.

Below is a list of 18 values in alpha

betical order.
We were interested in finding out the relative
importance of these values to the LSU student population.
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students
here recently.

These students were asked to place a

one next to the value which they thought most imjjo-rtant to them, a two next to the value which they thought
second most important, etc.

The value which they thought

least important was ranked 18th.

Please examine the

list carefully.
(Value list without ranks)
Now, would you please answer honestly the following
question in a related area:
Are you sympathetic with the aims of supporters
of the Equal Rights Amendment?
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Yes, and.

I have personally worked for the Amendment.

Yes, but

I have not personally worked for the

Amendment.
__

No.
The 298 students in the study described above

were asked this same question.

The students' results

were divided into three groups, according to how they
responded.

The table below shows the average ranking of

the values Freedom and Equality for each of these three
groups:
AVERAGE RANKINGS OF FREEDOM & EQUALITY
______________ BY LSU_STUDENTS_________________
Yes, & have worked for

Yes, but have not

No

the Amendment_________________ worked for the Amendment______
Freedom

6

1

Equality

5

11

2
17

Notice in the table that:
1)

Pro- and anti-ERA students all value freedom
relatively highly.

Of 18 values, all groups

rank Freedom among the top six.
2)

Students who are strongly for ERA value
Equality rather highly— they ranked it five.
But those against FRA place a much lower value
on Equality— they ranked it 17.

Those who
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are non-participants but are sympathetic ranked
Equality 11.
Apparently, both freedom and equality are important
to some people, while to others freedom is very important
but equality is not.

This raises the question whether

those who are against ERA are really saying that they
care a great deal about their own freedom but are in
different to other people's freedom.

Those who are for

ERA are perhaps really saying they not only want freedom
for themselves but for other people too.

What do you

think?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

0

1

1

I strongly agree

I strongly disagree

with this interpretation.

with this interpret
ation .

(Please check one)
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to
be valid in this study, you must be here for the second
phase which will be in two weeks.

We thank you and hope

this has been an interesting and instructive experience
for you.

Appendix D
Posttest Instructions-All Groups
Today we would like to find out about your values.
Your task is to arrange the values below in order of their
importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life.
Put a one next to the most important value, a two next
to the second most important value, etc., down to the
18th and least important value.

Please don't hesitate

to erase or to change answers in any way.

The end re

sult should show how you truly feel (if you have already
completed this survey, please complete it again.

It

is very important.).
(Value Survey)
This is the end of our study.

The purpose and

results of the study will be explained to you in class,
after all the results have been analyzed, probably in
a few weeks.

Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix E
Control G-roup Instructions
Phase I
This is a scientific study of value systems.
are no right or wrong answers in this study.

There

The best

answer is j'our own personal opinion.
Below is a list of 18 values in alphabetical order.
This scale was administered to 298 undergraduate students
here recently.

These students were asked to place a

one next to the value which they thought most important
"k°

a

riex't “t0 ^he value they thought second

most important, etc.

The value which they thought least

important was ranked 18th.

Please examine the list

carefully.
(Value list without ranks)
Now, wrou!d you please answer honest3_y the following
question in a related area:
Are you s y m p a t h e t i c with the aims of supporters of
the Equal Rights A m e n d m e n t ?

Yes,

and I have worked for the Amendment.

Yes,

but I have not worked for the Amendment.

No.
Now we would 1ike to find out about your values.
Your task is to arrange the values below in order of
their importance to YOur, as guiding principles in YOUR
87
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life.

Put a one next to the most important value, a

two next to the second most important value, etc.,
down to the 18th and least important value.

Please

d o n ’t hesitate to erase or to change answers in any way.
The end i^esult should show how you truly feel.
(Value Survey)
This is the end of this phase of our experiment.
We remind you that in order for your participation to
he valid in this study, you must be here for the second
phase which will be in two weeks.

We thank you

and hope this has been an interesting and instructive
experience for you.
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